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The Treatment of
Handicapped Newborns:
Is There a Role for Law?
Robert A. Burt*
We have just recently entered a new phase in the controversy
about the medical treatment of seriously impaired newborns. In Octo-
ber 1985 a new federal law went into effect which mandates the
provision of treatment to all infants, no matter how seriously ill or
impaired, unless they were inevitably and imminently dying or were
irreversibly comatose. 1 In one sense, this legal mandate is nothing new.
The law in every state has been clear for many years that purposefully
withholding medical treatment from newborns was criminal child
abuse and probably even homicide. 2 But though this was the "law on
the books," it was widely ignored in practice-a fact that was an open
secret among members of the medical profession.
Just thirteen years ago, in 1973, prominent members of the medi-
cal profession in effect let the public in on the secret. In an article in the
New England Journal of Medicine, Drs. Raymond Duff and Ian Camp-
bell-physicians who were members of the Yale Medical School faculty
and in charge of the newborn intensive care unit at the Yale-New
Haven Hospital-documented the fact that they and their medical
colleagues purposefully withheld life-saving treatment from some
'Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University; Professor of Law and Professor of
Law in Psychiatry, joint appointment of Law and Medical Schools, University of
Michigan, 1970-76; B.A. (magna cum laude) Princeton University, 1960; B.A. in Juris-
prudence, Oxford University, 1962; M.A. in Jurisprudence, Oxford University, 1968;
J.D. (cum laude) Yale University, 1964.
lChild Abuse Amendments of 1984, PUB. L. No. 98-457, tit. 1, sees. 121-28,98 STAT.
1749 (codified at 42 U.s.c. §§ 5101-5103 [Supp. 1985]).
2See Robertson, [lIvo[lIlItary Ellthallasia of Defective New/Jorlls: A Legal Analysis, 27
STANFORD L. REV 213, 217, 234-44 (1975).
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gravely ill infants. 3 The publication of this article was in effect a radical
break with past medical practice-for now these physicians, in the
prestigious forum of the New England Journal, were forcing public
knowledge, and demanding explicit public approval, of practices that
had previously occurred only behind closed clinical doors. This was
the first phase in the current controversy.
The second phase occurred during the succeeding decade after
this 1973 revelation. The Duff and Campbell article was met by con-
siderable hostility in some quarters-most notably among right to life
advocates who were spending most of their efforts opposing the Su-
preme Court's decision in the abortion case. 4 This Supreme Court
decision also occurred in 1973, and, though Duff and Campbell did not
make their public disclosure in direct response to this decision, the
same social forces that made it plausible for the Justices to issue their
public approbation of abortion as a protected choice by a woman with
her physician, also encouraged Duff and Campbell. to speak out in
behalf of the right of parents and physicians to withhold treatment
from seriously impaired newborns. There was, then, passionate oppo-
sition to both of these positions. But notwithstanding this opposition
regarding the right to choose abortion, the courts were for the most
part adamant in upholding the right and striking down restrictive state
legislation. At the same time during the decade between 1973 and
1983, there were some indications that courts would also mount the
ramparts to defend the claimed right of parents and physicians to
withhold medical treatment from impaired newborns.
Three critical court decisions supported such rights during this
time-a 1977 California Supreme Court ruling that the parents of a
child with Down's syndrome (in this case, not an infant but a ten-year-
old boy) had a right to refuse life-prolonging heart surgery for him;5
then a 1982 Indiana Supreme Court decision refusing to overturn
parents' refusal to consent to surgery to correct an esophogeal atresia
of a newborn infant with Down's syndrome that led to his death by
starvation (the so-called Indiana Baby Doe case);6 and in 1983, the Baby
3Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG.
J. MEV. 890 (1973).
4Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
SIn re Phillip B., 92 Cal.App.3d 796,156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949
(1980).
6In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Cir.Ct. Monroe Co., April 12, 1982), writ of
mandamus dismissed sub. nom. State of Indiana ex rei Infant Doe v. Monroe Circuit Court,
No. 482 S 140 (Ind., May 27, 1982), reprinted in HUMAN LIFE AND HEALTH CARE ETH-
ICS, Appendix B, 313-16 (J.Bopp ed., 1985). Both Indiana state court decisions are
unpublished.
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Jane Doe case in New York where both an appellate-level state court and
a federal district court ruled that parents had the right to refuse life-
prolonging surgery for their infant afflicted with spina bifida. 7 All of
these decisions, taken together; suggested that the courts were mov-
ing toward the result that Duff and Campbell urged in their 1973
article-to approve in principle the withholding of care from impaired
newborns.
Two other significant events occurred in 1982 during this second
phase of the controversy. A presidential commission on biomedical
ethics issued a report criticizing the Indiana Supreme Court decision
in the Baby Doe case, but at the same time endorsing the principle that
physicians and parents should have a right to withhold treatment in
what the Commission regarded as "appropriate" cases. 8 The Commis-
sion's criticism of Baby Doe was based on its judgment that Down's
syndrome is not in itself a proper basis for withholding treatment but
that, in other cases, it could be proper to conclude that a severely
impaired infant might be so incapacitated that survival would not be a
"net benefit" for the infant. 9 At the same time that this presidential
commission was deliberating, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) reacted to the Indiana court decision by estab-
lishing so-called "Baby Doe squads" to investigate all cases in feder-
ally-funded hospitals where medical treatment might be withheld
from newborns. In the 1983 Baby Jane Doe case, a federal court of
appeals ruled that HHS had no statutory authority to conduct these
investigations. 10
This, then, brings us to the third phase-the current phase of the
controversy. Congress responded to this court of appeals ruling by
passing the Child Abuse Amendment of 1984. This new statute does
not mean that the federal government now has authority to reinstate
the federal investigations. 11 Instead, the statute requires that states
themselves create investigative mechanisms, building on the same
agencies that now exist in every state to protect children against abuse
7Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687--87 (Sup.Ct.App.Div., 1983);
United States v. University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E. D.N. Y. 1983).
8PRESIDENT"S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIO-
MEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
219,227 (1983).
91d. at 218.
lOUnited States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Gr. 1984).
11See 130 CONGo REC. 11699 (1984) (quoting a letter from the principal Senate sponsors
of the 1984 amendments, "This legislation does not itself authorize direct federal
involvement in individual cases. ")
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or neglect, to ensure that all newborns receive medical treatment
unless they are inevitably dying or are irreversibly comatose-regard-
less of their parents' or physicians' wishes to the contrary.
This new statute is not necessarily the last word in this contro-
versy. It is conceivable that the courts could invalidate this legislation
on the ground that, like the choice for abortion, parents have a consti-
tutional right of "family privacy" to decide for or against treatment of
impaired infants. This is conceivable by building on the precedents in
California, Indiana and New York, that a court would reach this result.
It is unlikely, however, that any court today would reach this result. But
it was also unlikely in 1972, when the abortion case was pending before
the Supreme Court, that the Court would find a constitutional right to
abortion.
The issue, however, is not to predict how courts should respond
to this new legislation. It is instead to evaluate the merits of the
legislation and thus to consider not only how courts should respond to
it but also what the proper role of positive law is in this controversy. In
one sense this new legislation means to move us back to the begin-
ning-to reassert the principle that purposeful withholding of treat-
ment is wrong and violates the law in virtually all circumstances. But in
another sense, this legislation seems to put more force into this legal
command than it previously possessed. This time, the statute seems to
say we mean to enforce it.
As a matter of abstract principle, the resolution of this question is
puzzling and even deeply troubling. Considered in the abstract, there
are three possible resolutions:
1. to insist, as the new law seems to mandate, that virtually every
newborn no matter how gravely impaired receive the most
aggressive medical treatment available;
2. to give formal recognition to the rights of parents (or parents
acting in conjunction with physicians) to withhold treatment
whenever they see fit; or
3. to provide a formal mechanism so that parents (and physi-
cians) who want to withhold treatment must go to court where
a judge would be authorized in some categorically defined
set of "appropriate" cases to give advance approval to this
withholding.
As an abstract matter, each of these three alternatives are un-
satisfactory.12 Each is likely to carry substantially undesirable con-
l2See Burt, Authorizing Death for Anomalous Newborns in GENETICS AND THE LAW 435 (A.
Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976); Burt, Authorizing Death for Anomalous Newborns-Ten
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sequences: aggressive treatment of every newborn, no matter what the
consequences, could inflict terrible suffering on too many people
(both the newborn and its family); providing formal legal authority to
parents (or to parents and physicians) to withhold treatment whenever
they chose would ignore the proper role and the need for society to
protect vulnerable children against potentially abusive treatment from
their caretakers (and, we must note, retarded people have been spe-
cially vulnerable to abuse in this society); and giving authority to a
judge to decide beforehand whether treatment should be provided or
withheld would give only a hollow pretense of independent, publicly
accountable review of such decisions (as proven, in part, by the fact
judges in the past who have been charged with protecting the interests
of retarded people against wrongful sterilization or harmful institu-
tionalization have turned a collective blind eye on terrible abuses).
This conclusion, however, is not very helpful. If all of the possible
resolutions to this controversy are unsatisfactory, where then should
we turn? Ultimately, while there is no good solution-no one solution
that neatly solves all problems without creating other problems-there
is nonetheless a least worst solution; a solution, moreover, that is not
necessarily correct for all time but is nonetheless the best available for
this particular time in our social history. That solution is-for all its
difficulties and imperfections-the statute that the Congress has just
enacted.
During this past decade, until the enactment of this statute-
during the second phase of this controvery-our society has been
poised at the edge of embracing a principle that would proclaim the
right of parents (or parents and physicians) to withhold treatment from
impaired newborns. The consequences of embracing this principle, at
this moment in our social life, would be so harmful, so destructive-
not only for specific infants whose lives will be ended but more
generally, and even more fundamentally, for the ethos of communal
caretaking in our society-that we are best aqvised to reject the prin-
ciple clearly and forcefully. This forceful rejection is the public signifi-
cance of the 1984 congressional act.
The ethos of communal caretaking is already stretched thin in
our time. This social fact is a fundamental reason that the medical
profession generally is viewed these days with suspicion and even
hostility that just twenty years ago or even less would have been
inconceivable. As much as physicians might see this new congres-
sional act as a further expression of public mistrust, contemporary
social acceptance of parental rights or physicians' discretion to with-
Years Later in GENETICS AND THE LAW III (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1985) (forth-
coming).
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hold newborns' treatment would ultimately increase the erosion of
public confidence in the trustworthiness of the medical profession.
There is a deep issue at stake in this controversy; the issue is even
more than the ethical principle abstractly stated. It goes to the under-
lying way that we think about our relations with one another-
whether each of us in our social interactions is more to be trusted than
feared, whether each of us will truly and unquestioningly care for one
another or turn away from neediness. The real question is: when each
of us is or becomes needy (as inevitably occurs to everyone at least at
the beginning and at the end of life), whether others can be relied
upon to help. Though the current controversy about the status of
impaired newborns, and the provision of medical services to them, has
not been directly considered in these terms, the resolution of this
controversy at this moment in OJ..lr social life will be viewed-implicitly
if not explicitly-as an answer to this general question of overriding
social significance.
This proposition cannot be proven, but there are several reasons
that leads one to believe in its truth. If this proposition is correct or
even plausible, then it is imperative for the nurturance of our belief in
the caretaking potential of our society that we turn away from em-
bracing any principle that would erode that collective belief.
The first reason supporting this proposition can be drawn from a
detailed consideration of the 1977 California court case mentioned
earlier. The case involved a boy with Down's Syndrome named Phillip
Becker. Phillip was ten years old when the litigation first began in 1977.
He had been placed in im institution by his parents soon after his birth;
when he was six years old, physicians diagnosed a heart defect which,
they said, could be surgically corrected but otherwise would lead to his
early death. Phillip's parents refused permission for the surgery; after
several years of desultory discussions, the physicians brought suit
against the parents to compel surgery. The California courts decided,
however, that Phillip's parents had a right to refuse this surgery. 13 That
seemed the end of the matter (and, in due course, of Phillip).
The case then took an extraordinary turn. Mr. and Mrs. Herbert
Heath, who were volunteer workers in the retardation institution, had
become emotionally attached to Phillip; they had spent considerable
time with him both in the institution and on numerous visits in their
home. They then brought suit alleging in effect that their involvement
with Phillip, and the mutual emotional attachment between them and
him, meant that they should be considered his parents at least for
purposes of authorizing the surgical treatment that could save his life.
13In re Phillip B., 159 Cal. Rptr. 48.
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After extensive hearings and drawn-out appeals, the California courts
in effect reversed their first decision and ruled that the Heaths could
authorize this surgery for Phillip. 14
Mr. and Mrs. Becker maintained throughout these proceedings,
both in the courtroom and in the popular press which extensively
covered the case, that the Heaths were officious intermeddlers, inter-
lopers who were stealing their child and their rights to control their
child's fate. 15 The California courts, after first ruling that the Beckers as
Phillip's parents had a right to refuse treatment for him, then con-
cluded that the Beckers' refusal had effectively forfeited their status as
parents. (Though the courts did not explicitly say this, the Beckers
themselves acted on this interpretation; after the surgery was success-
fully performed, they agreed that the Heaths could formally adopt
Phillip.)
The Phillip Becker case reveals an underlying, though usually
unacknowledged, aspect of the general claim that the parents of seri-
ously impaired newborns have a right to withhold treatment from
them. The California courts' ambivalence on this issue was sharply
revealed in Phillip's case, and the ambivalence itself indicates that the
recognition of such right would transform our deepest conception of
what it means to be a parent. Even though a rational case can be made
that death is sometimes the best care that can be offered to a suffering
person, and even though it is rational to conclude that parents are
better situated than anyone else to decide the best care for their
child-Phillip Becker's case demonstrates the deep hold on our moral
sensibilities of the proposition that a true parent always chooses life for
his child and a true parent never willingly accepts the loss of a child.
This, after all, was the way that King Solomon determined the true
mother between the rival claimants-that the true mother would
never countenance the death of her child, no matter how much suf-
fering its continued life would bring to her.
This conception of parenthood-that the true parent always
chooses life, no matter what-is not, however, an eternal verity, true
for all time or for our society even in the immediate future. It may be
that the tragic choices pressed forward by our technological capacities
to extend life for gravely impaired newborns will lead us to a new
conception of what it means to be a parent. This, however, would be a
new conception and this new conception is at sharp odds with our
current ideas of true parental caretaking.
14W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITBREAD & S. DAVID. CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 921-23
(1983) (citing unpublished court opinions).
155ee W & P. Becker, Mourning the Loss ofa Son, Newsweek, May 30, 1983, at 17.
HeinOnline -- 1 Issues L. & Med. 286 1985-1986
286 Issues in Law & Medicine, Volume 1, Number 4, 1986
This proposition has direct parallels in our society's deepest
current views of the proper caretaking role of physicians as well as
parents-and accordingly that the claims of some physicians for a right
to choose against life-saving treatment is radically inconsistent with
the proposition that a true physician, like a true parent, always and
unquestioningly saves life. If we abandon it, we must first of all
acknowledge-as with the Beckers' claim of parental rights to with-
hold treatment-that this is also a new position and that abandoning
the old vision of the caretaking role of parents and physicians may
entail quite substantial social costs.
The extraordinary cultural authority of the medical profession in
this century has rested on a basic social conviction that physicians
work unquestioningly and unstintingly to save every life-that true
physicians do not judge whether their patients deserve to live or to die.
A public acknowledgment then that sometimes physicians do not act
in this way will have deeply unsettling implications for medical prac-
tice. This acknowledgment could change the definition of what it
means to be a physician in this society, and with this change, could
come an erosion of trust in physicians' curative capacities, a trust
which has traditionally led patients to look to physicians for help and
which has bolstered physicians' confidence in their capacity to help.
This social trust in the medical profession has already suffered con-
siderable erosion in the past twenty years or so; whatever the causes of
that erosion, the professional endorsement for withholding life-saving
treatment would give further impetus to this trend.
This proposition cannot be proven with scientific certainty. Its
social force is illustrated in the same way that the Phillip Becker case
showed the California judges initially embracing and then almost
instinctively recoiling from the comparable claim by parents. The
illustrative instance regarding the medical profession took place in the
1960s and early 1970s-not with newborns but with the question of
withholding medical care from patients in acute renal failure. When
the technology for renal dialysis was first developed, most notably in
Seattle in the early 1960s, a practical problem presented itself. There
were simply not enough resources available to provide dialysis for
everyone who might need the treatment. Accordingly Seattle physi-
cians created a formally structured committee to choose among com-
peting candidates-necessarily and visibly, therefore, to choose who
would live and who would die. 16
16See R. Fox &J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE To FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
AND DIALYSIS 240-79 (1974).
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When this committee became widely known through press
reports (it was popularly and pejoratively called the Seattle God Com-
mittee) there was considerable outcry, notwithstanding the under-
standable and sensible reasons that brought the committee into
existence. 17 The existence of the committee, in particular, offended the
social ideal that the role of physicians was to save life, that they should
not decide who deserved to live and limit treatment on that basis.
In 1972 the United States Congress acted to reaffirm this social
ideal by making an open-ended commitment of public funds to pro-
vide renal dialysis for anyone in need. 1M With a wave of its fiscal wand,
Congress thus ended the practical constraint that had produced the
Seattle God Committee. This was, it must be noted, an extravagent and
incautious financial commitment. The costs of this program have
grown since 1972 to well over one billion dollars each year for the
benefit of a limited number of people-twenty-five thousand or SO.19
This extraordinary commitment seemed based, moreover, on an obvi-
ous falsehood-on the false proposition that this society had suf-
ficient resources for medical care in order to save every life that might
technologically be saved in any circumstance.
What then led the Congress to take this extraordinary step in
1972? It was clear from the floor debates and earlier legislative hearings
that the members of Congress could not tolerate the moral implications
of the Seattle God Committee and its underlying operating premise
that life-saving medical care could be explicitly withheld from a needy,
helpless person. In one sense the Congress acted to reaffirm the norm
of the physician as an unquestioning nurturant caretaker. In this same
sense, the new congressional legislation requiring the provision of
life-saving treatment to all impaired newborns means to reaffirm this
same norm.
There is an even deeper moral norm that was visibly at work in
the 1972 renal dialysis legislation and is also implicated in the current
debate about impaired newborns. In 1972 the Congress found the
Seattle God Committee morally intolerable. Beneath this moral re-
vulsion was an image, an ideal, a mythic vision of a community. This
communal ideal was a homespun, uniquely American product. It is
the ideal enscribed, among other places, at the foot of the Statute of
Liberty: that no suffering person will ever be turned away from this
place, that our community is open and generous and rich enough
171d. at 224.
18See Rettig, The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing for Victims of End-Stage Renal
Disease, 40 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 196 (Autumn 1976).
191d. at 200-201. See also G. CALABREST & P. BOBBIT. TRAGlCCHOICES 186-89 (1978).
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to care for everyone in need, "give me your tired, your poor...." It
is, if you will, the American version of the new Jerusalem, the uni-
versal human community welcoming all strangers in need, turning
away no one.
To be sure, we have never had the full resources to honor this
commitment, we have never committed all possible resources available
for this purpose, and at various times in our history we have even
explicitly repudiated this commitment, but the Congress reaffirmed
this commitment in 1972 to people who would otherwise die from
kidney failure. These people were not a powerful political lobby in any
ordinary sense; there were after all only some twenty-five thousand of
them and even with their families and friends, few congressmen need
fear their retaliatory wrath at the polls. Their force arose simply be-
cause their neediness and suffering had become so publicly visible by
the very creation of the Seattle God Committee. To permit their deaths
in this circumstance was clearly to repudiate the inclusive communal
ideal in American life. Congress' commitment to save them became an
occasion for reaffirmation of this central communal ideal.
This reaffirmation had consequences beyond the fact that some
kidney patients lives were saved. One such consequence was congres-
sional enactment of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children
Act which repudiated state laws that had excluded such children from
public schools, thus banishing them to geographically hidden residen-
tial institutions, and which made a considerable commitment of fed-
eral funds to assist states in the education of these children. 20 This
legislation was the consequence of the earlier action regarding renal
dialysis since it shared the same vision of an inclusive community,
rejecting no one and making special effort to include those with special
vulnerabilities.
This pursuit, moreover, was not limited to people with special
health disabilities. There was a similar connection between the 1972
legislation for kidney patients, the 1975 legislation for handicapped
children, and the 1968 open housing act which prohibited race dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of homes throughout the nation. 21 This
communal commitment in turn came from the moral force, the inclu-
sive communal vision, of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. 22 All of these actions were of a piece; each shared the
same underlying moral vision; each had a consequential relationship
with the other. There was no necessary causal connection among
20PUB. L. No. 94-142 (1975) (codified at 20 US.c. §§ 1400-1420 [1982]).
2142 US.c. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
22347 US. 483 (1954).
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them; one act did not make it inevitable for the other to follow. One act
made it easier for the next-easier but not inevitable. The converse is
also true-that a refusal to acknowledge an inclusive communal re-
lation with one group makes it easier to ignore the claims, to repudiate
any communal relation, with another.
The underlying stubborn reality is that each of these acts of
communal inclusion and affirmation was met with resistance and
remains filled with difficulty. The underlying reality is that communal
bonds are fragile, difficult to forge or to sustain and easily obstructed
or repudiated. These bonds-never more than tenuous linkages built
against powerful psychological and social forces that drive us apart-
lead us toward hostile competition for inevitably limited resources and
make us fearful strangers to one another.
The truth in this abstraction only reveals itself in concrete en-
counters among specific human beings. One such encounter-when
the fragility of our common human bonds is- most strikingly re-
vealed-is when parents who have expected and hoped for a "normal,"
indeed a "perfect," child are suddenly confronted with a less-than-
perfect, a seriously abnormal, infant. At that moment, their capacity to
include this unexpected and even unwanted child into their family,
into the "family of mankind," is put to an unexpected test. At that
moment of testing, the general ethos of the society, in which these
parents live and into which this abnormal infant has been born, will
inevitably have considerable impact on the parents' willingness and
capacity to welcome rather than to turn away from this infant.
The question at this moment, moreover, is not simply how the
general society treats mentally or physically disabled people. The more
basic question is whether the society offers support to all who are in
need, or whether the dominant ethos is rigidly competitive and indi-
vidualistic, or whether the ethos is "every man for himself." In such a
society, parents would know not only that their abnormal child was
unwelcome, but that no one would offer assistance to them in their
efforts to meet the special needs of this child. In such a society, these
parents would know that they too, if they welcomed this child into
their immediate family, would be jeopardizing their own welcome as
members of the broader society.
This would be the underlying implication if this society were
explicitly to recognize that parents have a right to withhold life-saving
treatment from their impaired child. Those who argue for such a right
rest their case on the norms of "family privacy" and "freedom of
choice." The underlying implication of this position is that the parents'
relationship with their impaired child is indeed a "private affair," and
if the parents choose to accept this child into their family, that is their
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private act with no public significance. To put it in the vernacular, "they
have made their bed, now they must lie in it," or this child is "nobody's
business but their own." In other words, having made this private
choice, the parents are obliged to bear the consequences of this choice
in private; they can look to no one but themselves and their own
resources to support the special and specially demanding needs of this
child.
In principle, one might argue that even with this background
understanding, the parents' decision whether to accept or reject this
child would be an exercise of "freedom of choice," but the common
sense of the matter is that few parents would see themselves as truly
free agents in making such a choice. Most parents would be strongly
influenced by the surrounding social context in which this decision is
made. If a child, because of his impairments, will put special strain on
their resources, both emotional and financial, and if no one will help
bear these burdens, this knowledge must inevitably affect a decision,
even if it does not necessarily dictate one clear result over another. If,
moreove~ the decision belongs to the parents whether to accept this
child and its special burdens because our society values "privacy" and
"freedom" above all else, how tempting it is for them to embrace one
particular version of these values-"privacy" and "freedom" defined
as interpersonal distance and disengagement-in order to put dis-
tance between the parents and this abnormal and burdensome child:
to choose "freedom" by freeing themselves from this child.
In this paradoxical way, the social norm that parents have free
choice becomes readily translated into a unilateral mandate to choose
death for the child. In this paradoxical way, the parents' supposed
choice even becomes effectively transformed into a perceived duty
enforced by infliction of a social penalty. The duty is to remove the
severely impaired child from the community. The penalty for parents'
failure to act on this duty is that they must bear all the special burdens
of this child on their own, without support or even sympathy from the
"normal" community.
furtunately, this is not the direction our society has chosen to
take. The enactment of the 1984 legislation was a reaffirmation of our
vision of ourselves as a nurturant, caretaking community. This is the
basic reason for its enactment-not because in every individual case,
the statute will lead to the best possible result for the specific newborn
infant and his family but because of the social implications of other
possible solutions. The formal social recognition of the right of parents
or physicians or judges to withhold treatment in specific cases would
harm more infants and their families than it might help and would,
moreove~ have even wider harmful social implications. This formal
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recognition would not only depict parents and physicians as less
nurturant, less reliable, caretakers than we had previously believed. It
would also, for that very reason, undermine any commonly held
vision that American society is a place of common concerns and of
mutual support and sustenance.
fur those who are inclined to see this legislation as a defeat-as
an intrusion on the rights of parents or the professional prerogatives of
physicians-should reconsider and see this legislation as an essential,
though still incomplete, victory for the common aspiration of parents
and physicians, to sustain and nurture all, even the seemingly most
unworthy individual, in times of affliction and need.
HeinOnline -- 1 Issues L. & Med. 292 1985-1986
